Jump to content


The Truth.... As We Know It


  • Please log in to reply
332 replies to this topic

Rosha_ #281 Posted Feb 06 2015 - 00:39

    Sergeant

  • Players
  • 13129 battles
  • 206
  • Member since:
    03-11-2014
Sorry, but thats [edited].  Neither Crear nor McNaughton were  anywhere near as good a General as was Sir Arthur W. Currie was in the  WW I.  It was the troops trained under Curries methods that deserve praise not the Canadian Generals who at best were of average ability.

sirericbreheny #282 Posted Feb 06 2015 - 02:05

    Captain

  • Players
  • 12666 battles
  • 1,274
  • [GRIP_] GRIP_
  • Member since:
    03-12-2013

View PostRosha_, on Feb 05 2015 - 19:39, said:

Sorry, but thats [edited].  Neither Crear nor McNaughton were  anywhere near as good a General as was Sir Arthur W. Currie was in the  WW I.  It was the troops trained under Curries methods that deserve praise not the Canadian Generals who at best were of average ability.

 

Exactly Sir Arthur Currie, he also was behind the scenes in World War 2, he took a very dim view of Montgomery's and Patton's Glory Seeking ways.   The Canadians fighting in Italy Currie thought deserved the same glory for their contrabution but what could Currie do.....a good general but always playing Second Fiddle to people like Hague, whom was 100 times Glory Seeking as what Montgomery ever could hope to be.  Unfortunately thanks to the Canadian Commanders being killed in the field, some commanders moved up into the ranks during World War 2; alot paid with their lives for underestimating the German Military.

Edited by sirericbreheny, Feb 06 2015 - 02:08.


Zinegata #283 Posted Feb 06 2015 - 02:59

    Major

  • Beta Testers
  • 9922 battles
  • 5,425
  • Member since:
    07-27-2010

View PostDunfalach, on Feb 05 2015 - 11:45, said:

View PostZinegata, on Feb 04 2015 - 21:28, said:

Lee meanwhile was terribly overrated. He actually constantly gambled that his numerically inferior troops would carry the day. That worked in Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville, but with a little more luck and a few less Union regiments breaking both battles could have left the ANV surrounded and wiped out. That he did so poorly at Gettysburg was not because he had a bad day - it was a reflection of his gambling mentality and growing overconfidence, which resulted in Pickett's Charge.

 

Of the Confederate Generals, Johnston and Longstreet had the most sense since they quickly grasped that technology now favored being on the defensive at the tactical level.

 

By all the accounts I've seen, Pickett's Charge was not hubris but lack of information regarding what he was truly up against. Gettysburg was an encounter battle...fought in a place that the two armies met. rather than a pre-determined battle plan. Lee was a gambler, yes. But a calculated gambler of necessity. The South could not turtle up and wait it out on the defensive; they lacked the manpower and industrial power to win a long war of attrition against the north. While the tactical situation may have favored the defense, the strategic situation did not.

 

For every historian that credits Johnston and Longstreet with vision and justifiable caution, there's another that credits them with lost opportunities and sluggish obstinacy. It's a constant debate. What we do know is that the north offered Lee command of the Union Army before he resigned his commission to return to Virginia, and he seems to have remained respected by his opponents.

 

The problem with the "Lee launched Pickett's Charge because of bad intelligence" school of thought is that he kept gambling with attacks off those odds anyway even when he knew the enemy was numerically superior earlier in the war.

 

Chancellorsville, his supposed masterpiece, was in fact an exercise in foolhardly recklessness that literally would have taken just one less unlucky break on the Union side to end as a complete Confederate disaster. Lee essentially launched a full-scale attack on Hooker with inferior numbers, when his retreat route was already cut off by Sedgwick. Had Jackson's Corps not lucked out and hit the worst Union Corps (which still managed to take out a quarter of his Corps anyway despite being attacked in camp conditions), Hooker not injured by a cannon shot, and had Sedgwick received his orders to attack Lee's rear the ANV may very well have found itself completely surrounded. As it stood all they actually did was to rout one Corps and push the Union back, but they were in fact nowhere near surrounding or routing the Union Army as the "had Jackson lived!" school of thought always declaims.

 

While this worked early on, that gambling mentality was precisely why Lee launched Picket's Charge in the first place - he'd seen his men seemingly win before against superior numbers and thought they would carry the day again; without realizing that he had in fact come so close to utter disaster with his gambling in his previous battles.

 

Other Confederate armies, being told that the Lee method was the way to go, thus ended up launching a long string of reckless offensives of their own usually with calamitous results. Bragg for instance is usually derided as a bad Confederate General because he essentially got the Confederate Army in the West destroyed after a series of offensives, but in many ways he was just following Lee's methodology and history only frowns on him because he was less lucky. Indeed, considering he almost retook Nashville - a city of actual consequence to the war in the West - he was actually more successful than Lee whose big battles were fought around insignificant towns like Antietam or Gettysburg

 

Longstreet and Johnston both by contrast both understood that they had been playing with fire and the Union army wasn't the same rabble that routed despite having a 2:1 numbers advantage at First Bull Run. Indeed, Chancellorsville was in fact a Confederate strategic defeat - for despite inflicting more losses the ANV's losses were essentially irreplaceable due to the smaller Southern manpower pool and the fact that fewer southerners actually wanted to fight (their desertion rates were consistently worse). Having an army-in-being was in fact more important, while Lee was stuck in the mindset of trying to win a decisive battle ala Waterloo without realizing that Waterloo was merely the coup'de grace to a French Army that has been attrited over a decade of steady fighting.


Edited by Zinegata, Feb 06 2015 - 11:01.


Zinegata #284 Posted Feb 06 2015 - 03:10

    Major

  • Beta Testers
  • 9922 battles
  • 5,425
  • Member since:
    07-27-2010

View Postsirericbreheny, on Feb 06 2015 - 06:23, said:

 

Zinegata, I am also reminded in the movie A Bridge Too Far, as well as from a military newspaper correspondance about Patton being angry about an shellshocked infantryman whom was wounded in a hospital bed....or was that MacArthur?   Patton takes out his sixgun shooters aiming it at the wounded man and would have shot him if not the hospital staff and security staff restrained him.   Apparently Patton and Montgomery never accounted for the horrors of war in the same way that average soldiers, sailors and airmen could be injured and have their minds harmed as much as they were, Patton thought such men were "cowards" even faking such effects as "Shellshock".   It was a real medical condition that hurt alot of frontline personnel that fought it.

 

Patton was always a little nuts. Monty however was actually well-liked by the troops because he did, to a large extent, understand their situation. The thing is, both men understood that wars cannot be won by pampering the infantryman at the front. Sometimes you have to launch an attack that will get a lot of men killed. That Monty kept attacking at El Alamein despite his subordinates asking for a pause due to the heavy casualties being suffered was not an act of callousness or heartlessness but necessity - heavy casualties are in fact expected in these kinds of slugfests; and you can't avoid fighting these slugfests all the time.

 

Monty's real problem was his ego and his inability to admit to any mistakes (which is why the Dutch loathe him and his "Market Garden was 90% successful" apologism); which in any case Patton's was little better at it. Monty's other main failing - he kept losing the better part of entire Armored Divisions in fruitless attacks on German anti-tank gun positions - is at least excusable because Monty by and large inhereted that structure from the dysfunctional British armored development of the 30s.


Edited by Zinegata, Feb 06 2015 - 03:11.


Rosha_ #285 Posted Feb 06 2015 - 04:17

    Sergeant

  • Players
  • 13129 battles
  • 206
  • Member since:
    03-11-2014

View Postsirericbreheny, on Feb 05 2015 - 20:05, said:

 

Exactly Sir Arthur Currie, he also was behind the scenes in World War 2, he took a very dim view of Montgomery's and Patton's Glory Seeking ways.   The Canadians fighting in Italy Currie thought deserved the same glory for their contrabution but what could Currie do.....a good general but always playing Second Fiddle to people like Hague, whom was 100 times Glory Seeking as what Montgomery ever could hope to be.  Unfortunately thanks to the Canadian Commanders being killed in the field, some commanders moved up into the ranks during World War 2; alot paid with their lives for underestimating the German Military.

 

I think you might be confusing him with some one else.  He died in 1933.  

Kharsis #286 Posted Feb 06 2015 - 07:14

    First lieutenant

  • Players
  • 12509 battles
  • 581
  • [-T-G-] -T-G-
  • Member since:
    04-29-2012

View PostZinegata, on Feb 05 2015 - 14:34, said:

Also, I have to note: Monty's reputation for cautiousness is totally unwarranted. Monty was simply the sort of commander who would not back down when the fighting started; which is why he kept attacking at El Alamein even though his subordinates were asking for a pause and bemoaning their losses. In fact he was a touch reckless with the way he deployed his armor, culminating in Market-Garden which was one of the ultimate high-stakes operation of the war.

 

That Patton keeps getting promoted as a speedster really goes to show how Hollywood can terribly jilt the public's perception of history.

 

Further to this is the fact that Montgomery was commanding what was virtually the last substantial forces of the British & Commonwealth Armies (the rest were with Slim in Burma).  For this reason Monty was very cautious with his men, and was pprpared to use as many resources as necessary

blurr91 #287 Posted Feb 11 2015 - 21:03

    Major

  • Players
  • 14160 battles
  • 2,551
  • Member since:
    05-21-2011

I have a question and don't recalled being asked or answered here.

 

 

Why did Germans concentrate their resources opposing Montgomery?  What reputation did Montgomery have within the German officer corps?



The_Chieftain #288 Posted Feb 11 2015 - 21:50

    Military Specialist

  • Administrator
  • 13737 battles
  • 9,916
  • [WGA] WGA
  • Member since:
    09-08-2011

View Postblurr91, on Feb 11 2015 - 20:03, said:

I have a question and don't recalled being asked or answered here.

 

 

Why did Germans concentrate their resources opposing Montgomery?  What reputation did Montgomery have within the German officer corps?

 

I don't know if Montgomery had any particular reputation per se, but the reason that the Germans focused on him seems to be the same reason they didn't care much about Patton: Monty's forces were in the most threatening geographic position. In North Africa, he pushing against Libya where the Axis were focused. In Sicily, his forces were the ones heading directly to the Axis route of escape. In Europe, he was the one closest to the German industrial heartland, taking the most direct route.

 

Montgomery's forces could have been commanded by any competent general, in that position, the Germans would have to honor the threat regardless.



Donward #289 Posted Feb 11 2015 - 23:12

    Major

  • Players
  • 46957 battles
  • 7,083
  • [C-BOO] C-BOO
  • Member since:
    08-29-2011

View Postblurr91, on Feb 11 2015 - 12:03, said:

I have a question and don't recalled being asked or answered here.

 

 

Why did Germans concentrate their resources opposing Montgomery?  What reputation did Montgomery have within the German officer corps?

 

Are you talking at Normandy?

 

Look at the map. The terrain and geographic location of the British forces at Normandy dictated that the Germans would concentrate the majority of their armored formations against the British sector. If Montgomery's position caved in, the entire Normandy beachhead could have been rolled up. So Montgomery was faced with the unpleasant task of not just holding the key defensive line of the Allies but also attacking the Germans through Caen and crossing the Orne River in order to gain enough real estate to deploy reinforcements and to pivot on the Axis positions. 



SparkyGT #290 Posted Feb 12 2015 - 17:41

    Major

  • Players
  • 51815 battles
  • 4,574
  • [-NHL-] -NHL-
  • Member since:
    02-05-2012

View Postblurr91, on Feb 11 2015 - 13:03, said:

I have a question and don't recalled being asked or answered here.

 

 

Why did Germans concentrate their resources opposing Montgomery?  What reputation did Montgomery have within the German officer corps?

 

Once monty started in North Africa, things started turning around for the british, he remained in command for a while, so the "old" nemesis.  Auchinleck didnt fare so well against the germans

blurr91 #291 Posted Feb 12 2015 - 20:15

    Major

  • Players
  • 14160 battles
  • 2,551
  • Member since:
    05-21-2011

View PostSparkyGT, on Feb 12 2015 - 08:41, said:

 

Once monty started in North Africa, things started turning around for the british, he remained in command for a while, so the "old" nemesis.  Auchinleck didnt fare so well against the germans

 

So basically Germans knew about Monty because they fought in North Africa.  Monty was capable, and did win.  Monty was in charge of a very large formation from the most threatening vector.  Therefore Germany concentrated large resources against Monty at the expense of the peripherals.

 

Does that mean if Patton were in charge of this large formation from the most threatening vector of approach into Germany, Patton would have received just as much attention from the Germans as Monty?

 

By the way, love your clan and logo.


Edited by blurr91, Feb 12 2015 - 20:15.


The_Chieftain #292 Posted Feb 12 2015 - 20:23

    Military Specialist

  • Administrator
  • 13737 battles
  • 9,916
  • [WGA] WGA
  • Member since:
    09-08-2011

View Postblurr91, on Feb 12 2015 - 19:15, said:

 

Does that mean if Patton were in charge of this large formation from the most threatening vector of approach into Germany, Patton would have received just as much attention from the Germans as Monty?

 

 

 

More so, probably, since Monty would no longer have been the primary threat.



SparkyGT #293 Posted Feb 12 2015 - 20:40

    Major

  • Players
  • 51815 battles
  • 4,574
  • [-NHL-] -NHL-
  • Member since:
    02-05-2012

One thing i remember reading way back was how patton was getting low supplies as compared to Monty. if patton woulda had them would he have pushed farther and faster, that would have been both good and bad, overextended possibly

 

thanks blurr91



Rosha_ #294 Posted Feb 12 2015 - 22:48

    Sergeant

  • Players
  • 13129 battles
  • 206
  • Member since:
    03-11-2014

I feel it would have hurt the war more imo.  My reasoning was that the southern Germany was not as important as northern Germany as it had a higher percentage of Industrial might there as well as it allowed the push into the Netherlands & Belgium  ( this would have been psychological as the Liberation would be seen as proof to the other occupied nations they would be free soon as well as to the 'Homelands" news reels of cities being liberated rather then troops in bombed out German cities).  Also debatable is that the push from the south would have taken longer and might have allowed Stalin to push further east in Germany.  



Donward #295 Posted Feb 12 2015 - 23:32

    Major

  • Players
  • 46957 battles
  • 7,083
  • [C-BOO] C-BOO
  • Member since:
    08-29-2011
Ok. Enough of this. Patton wouldn't have "gotten more men and supplies" because there weren't enough to be had because most of the supplies were still coming from the Normandy beachhead. In order to get more supplies, you have to liberate the port of Antwerp. Antwerp was the KEY to Germany. You couldn't waltz into Germany without it. The job of liberating Antwerp fell to the British and Canadians since they were north and it fell on their natural axis of advance. There were also secondary political reasons like knocking out Hitler's V2 weapons, etc.

The Germans knew all of this as well. They knew if they could delay Antwerp's capture they could prolong the war.

There were logical military reasons for these actions. It wasn't some jousting match between Patton or Monty or "respecting an opponent".

Edited by Donward, Feb 14 2015 - 03:38.


Zinegata #296 Posted Feb 15 2015 - 04:16

    Major

  • Beta Testers
  • 9922 battles
  • 5,425
  • Member since:
    07-27-2010

A thing to remember as well about Antwerp is that the Allies didn't really fully realize or expect how vital it would end up being. 

 

The original breakout plan in fact advocated capturing the ports in Brittany (e.g. Brest) and the Channel ports (e.g. Calais and Le Havre); but the ports proved hard to crack due to all the new fixed defenses (another oft-forgotten disadvantage of delaying Normandy from 1943 to 1944) hence resulting in Ike ordering that most of them simply be bypassed. Indeed, some of them did not surrender until May 1945.

 

That Antwerp fell so quickly and with so little damage was in fact something of a surprise especially considering the experience of the Allies in the other ports, and indeed the speed of advance was what motivated Ike to gamble on Market-Garden to try and win the war in 1944. The problem, and this is a massive failure of intelligence that has never been adequately accounted for, was that the Germans were able to transfer 15th Army - which had already been surrounded at Pas De Calais - from the Channel ports to Holland via ferries in spite of supposed Allied naval and aerial superiority. This gave the German defenders in Holland another 100,000 to 200,000 soldiers to play with; which combined to both frustrate Market-Garden and end all hope of clearing the Scheldt quickly.

 

That a bag of prisoners as large (if not larger) than the one at Falaise managed to escape and is almost never recounted in the histories again shows how so much of WW2 is still unexplored, even in the supposedly "open" Western accounts.



xlightwavex #297 Posted Feb 15 2015 - 18:55

    Corporal

  • Players
  • 322 battles
  • 54
  • Member since:
    10-16-2011

this is a good overview for normandy to the end of caen and the creation of the falaise pocket

https://www.youtube....h?v=94JmIL7RvhM

this is a educational video from the battlefield series a well laid out british documentary with about 30 battles as well as some lesser known ones such as

the finish war, norway (wasserbeung), layte gulf, manchuria, the crimea, the naval war in the mediterranean

(in which the British, Luftwaffe and Italian fleets fought numerous viscous battles for control of malta and the entire med)

 

neither monty or patton was the threat to german generals

the germans had no short supply of talented officers such as von manstien guendarian rommel von rundstadt bach hoth or model) model who in this case was sent west to deal with the threat

 

the greatest threat to the germans in the west was their lack of supply's reinforcements and air support

this can be seen were model faced off against monty at caen holding the vital road junctions there and again during market garden

when 3rd army broke out to the south and began the pincer move that created the falaise pocket around caen the german's fought desperately to keep it from closing but kept it open long enough for most to escape

 

patton and monty had no fondness for each other especially patton who was critical of monty's abilitys

he couldn't keep his opinions to himself when asked about monty in front of the press he got sidelined for his words

patton

in at least one occasion clearly showed up monty in sicily were with a smaller force he disobeyed orders to stop, he essentially outflanked the german's and monty's frontal assault

forcing the german's to withdraw back to italy

after this they were kept apart i think somewhat purposefully, patton seems to have done more with less

but monty was a cautious somewhat too cautious general and didn't always exploit opportunity's which meant less risk but extending the war

monty was a defensive general like model but model would exploit clear weakness with attacks,

patton was more like many of his german counterparts in his agressive flanking pincers and deployments

 


Edited by xlightwavex, Feb 15 2015 - 19:04.


The_Chieftain #298 Posted Feb 15 2015 - 18:59

    Military Specialist

  • Administrator
  • 13737 battles
  • 9,916
  • [WGA] WGA
  • Member since:
    09-08-2011

View Postxlightwavex, on Feb 15 2015 - 17:55, said:

in at least one occasion clearly showed up monty in sicily were with a smaller force he disobeyed orders to stop

he essentially outflanked the german's and monty's frontal assault forcing the german's to withdraw back to italy

 

 

That may not be the most accurate view of history. The Germans never intended to hold Sicily indefinitely, and Patton's left loop did not stop them getting more of their troops off the island than they thought there were going to be able to.



Rosha_ #299 Posted Feb 16 2015 - 03:02

    Sergeant

  • Players
  • 13129 battles
  • 206
  • Member since:
    03-11-2014
Also the fact is that Monty believed in preparing for all contingencies , while Patton sometime just went with his gut instincts and hoped that all would go right or someone else would pull his nuts out of the fire.  A good example is when he was running low on fuel  rather then adjust his advance rate he just charged forward running out of fuel and hoped that Army group would find fuel for him.  Both were Devas, but I wouldn't have put him in command of an Army Group like Bradley or Montgomery.  IMHO Patton would have made a decent Corp commander,  or a great Divisional commander, but he wasn't a good Army commander. 

xlightwavex #300 Posted Feb 23 2015 - 14:20

    Corporal

  • Players
  • 322 battles
  • 54
  • Member since:
    10-16-2011

 

Block Quote

The Germans never intended to hold Sicily indefinitely

maybe true but when does one intend to ever withdraw as a plan in war

but the fact is it was Sicily was Montys baby and he is the one that got bottled up

Pattons move simply made the German defense untenable and forced there withdraw

to boot patton had to goto alexander to get the ok to do it over monty and got it

that says somthing as well about how alexander felt about patton.

 

also note that monty was not the first pick for the 8th army William Gott was

 

Block Quote

IMHO Patton would have made a decent Corp commander,  or a great Divisional commander

 

well that's besides the fact in that, the fact is he was a army commander

in reality...

he was in command of the largest of the 4 American army's

3rd army had many divisions itself

 

    Third Army - General George S. Patton, Jr.
        4th Infantry Division - Major General Harold W. Blakeley
        78th Infantry Division - Major General Allison J., Barnett
        III Corps - Major General James Van Fleet
            14th Armored Division - Major General Albert C. Smith
            99th Infantry Division - Major General Walter E. Lauer
        V Corps - Major General Clarence R. Huebner
            9th Armored Division - Major General John W. Leonard
            16th Armored Division - Brigadier General John L. Pierce
            1st Infantry Division - Major General Clift Andrus
            2nd Infantry Division - Major General Walter M. Robertson
            97th Infantry Division - Brigadier General Milton B. Halsey
        XII Corps - Major General Stafford LeRoy Irwin
            4th Armored Division - Major General William M. Hoge
            11th Armored Division - Major General Holmes E. Dager
            5th Infantry Division - Major General Albert E. Brown
            26th Infantry Division - Major General Willard S. Paul
            90th Infantry Division - Major General Herbert L. Earnest
        XX Corps - Major General Walton Walker
            13th Armored Division - Major General John Millikin
            65th Infantry Division - Major General Stanley E. Reinhardt
            71st Infantry Division - Major General Willard G. Wyman
            80th Infantry Division - Major General Horace L. McBride

 

Block Quote

but he wasn't a good Army commander

but that's a hard opinion to defend

as...

the Germans did respect him as a good army commander

in that ...

a major part of the disinformation plan for operation fortitude relied on, the positioning of his army, it was a major part of the deception strategy

 

also

Block Quote

 


German general Günther Blumentritt,

a key planner of the invasions of France
"We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive Panzer General of the Allies

General Heinz Guderian himself,

after Germany's surrender, told his Allied captors,
"From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him for his victory since he acted as I should have done had I been in his place."

 

 

i dunno how they looked at Monty, ... (maybe that is the real question)


Edited by xlightwavex, Feb 23 2015 - 15:09.





1 user(s) are reading this topic

0 members, 0 guests, 0 anonymous users