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Mantanikau Guadalcanal

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Kankou #21 Posted Oct 25 2012 - 18:42

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View PostCrunchy_Buster, on Oct 25 2012 - 17:47, said:

Thant never happened, for whatever the reason, and hence, the IJA was infantry-centric and their tanks sucked during WW2.
No one argues with the fact the IJA basically did not change. However, whether it was a purely cultural/institutional problem or an industrial capacity problem is where there would be differences of opinion.

kurgen22 #22 Posted Oct 25 2012 - 20:00

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Japan was an Island Nation with limited resources. It tended to put a large amount of its resources in the IJN. One of it's fatal flaws was it's belief that thet were racially superior to other Asians and Anglos, They thought that a simple bayonet charge would scattertheir enemies like chaff. It carried ove in many ways to its industry. They felt that their equipment was superior and never made a large scale effort to improve it.  The attacks on the Canal were beat back with tremendous loss. They finally grasped the concept that the Allies werent about to cower in a hole, but answer with an effective combined armed defense. In the Islands the Japanese were able to develop tactics for coordinating small arms and artillery in the defense, but their attacks were almost light infantry weapons with a smattering of artillery for support, They never were able to cordinate Artillery, close Air support, tanks and naval gunfire as effectively as the allies did,

thandiflight #23 Posted Oct 25 2012 - 20:15

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View Postkurgen22, on Oct 25 2012 - 20:00, said:

Japan was an Island Nation with limited resources. It tended to put a large amount of its resources in the IJN. One of it's fatal flaws was it's belief that thet were racially superior to other Asians and Anglos, They thought that a simple bayonet charge would scattertheir enemies like chaff. It carried ove in many ways to its industry. They felt that their equipment was superior and never made a large scale effort to improve it.  The attacks on the Canal were beat back with tremendous loss. They finally grasped the concept that the Allies werent about to cower in a hole, but answer with an effective combined armed defense. In the Islands the Japanese were able to develop tactics for coordinating small arms and artillery in the defense, but their attacks were almost light infantry weapons with a smattering of artillery for support, They never were able to cordinate Artillery, close Air support, tanks and naval gunfire as effectively as the allies did,

There is no doubt that the IJN received a large proportion of resources. One has to ask "why?". The evidence seems to be "because the Army never asked". Again the question has to be "why?". They studied the problem, determined there was a problem....then did nothing. Yet again "why?". The IJN prepared for a new type of warfare, a type of warfare that it was increasingly apparent would be the way the next war would be fought. They led the World with carrier building and advanced ships and submarines. The IJA was preparing to fight Kublai Kahn and the Mongolians - just with more modern weapons.

iron_elephant #24 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 02:43

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IJA tanks may have a real hard time competing against other nations (especially those IJA tanks that actually saw action, the drawing board tanks look fierce) but I am of South East Asian and Arabic decent on my father's side so I really want to see non Western tanks get introduced regardless of their stats.

322prashant #25 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 09:53

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View PostHowlmistPanzer, on Oct 25 2012 - 08:15, said:

Awesome like always ...Chieftain, can u write someting abt the Battle of Assal Uttar , Indo Pak war of 1965 ? :)

The Centurion tank was my favourite in this war. It saved the Indian army as it smashed apart the Pakistan army's Shermans, Pattons and M36s..clearly the Centurion was AWESOME...



322prashant #26 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 09:55

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I wish the Japanese tank tree rolls out soon..cant wait to get my hands on a Type 97 medium or a prototype heavy which was in blueprints or a prototype.....

Kankou #27 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 10:45

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View Postthandiflight, on Oct 25 2012 - 20:15, said:

The evidence seems to be "because the Army never asked".
And that is where your premise is wrong. The IJA did ask, but Japan was in no capability to support a running war in China (committing hundreds of thousands of troops) and also build the sufficient tank types/numbers to prepare for a rematch against the Soviets.

The production of the Shinhoto Chi-Ha, designed to counter Soviet tanks, was first produced starting from 1942, three years after Nomonhan. During the two year production time, 930 units were built. After that, the Type 1 Chi-He had 170 units and the Type 3 Chi-Nu amounted to 166 units. Supposing we include the original Type 97 Chi-Ha starting from 1938 (1,162 units), we have a total of 2,428 medium tanks of all kinds built between 1938 and 1945, which was the full capacity of the Japanese industry at the time. Compare this to the production of the Valentine, which amounted to 8,275 from 1939 to 1945. During the entire war, Japan was unable to produce less than 1/3 of a single British tank model, not because the Army didn't ask for it, but because there was no domestic capacity to produce the amount of tanks the IJA would have wanted in the first place.

PzKpfw_1 #28 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 13:43

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Japan did not have the resources to sustain large number production of tanks etc, Nor the shipping required to transport tanks in large numbers especialy after the US subs started destroying the Japanese merchant fleet in large numbers. The situation only got worse after the carrier & material losses after Midway. Japanese resources were insufficent the whole war, thats one of the major reasons Japan started the war, to secure by force, the raw materials she lacked indigenously, ie, oil, rubber, steel, ore etc. Not to mention the IJN had priority on material througout the war over the IJA. Japan quested for that one decisive fleet action the whole war & to do that Japan needed ships, not tanks.

Regards, John Waters

Edited by PzKpfw_1, Oct 26 2012 - 13:46.


PzKpfw_1 #29 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 13:43

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Dont know why but it dbl posted sorry.

Regards, John Waters

Edited by PzKpfw_1, Oct 26 2012 - 13:45.


thandiflight #30 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 14:20

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The Chi-Nu was developed in 6 months in 1943 - at the height of the expansion and with resources at the maximum, but it was given a low priority for production. By the time it did enter production in 1944 resources were scarce. The truth is Japan NEVER gave much priority to armoured warfare. You simply do not asign a low priority to what the Army regards an essential item unless the Army does not regard it an essential item.

As for Midway being the catalyst for the collapse, that is not true. Japan still had carriers and plenty of aircraft. The IJN was still very much a force to be reckoned with. It was only after the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" that the Navy effectively ran out of pilots. And after Leyte Gulf that the IJN was confined to home waters due to lack of oil. As for a lack of shipping capable of moving tanks that does not seem to be true either. The Chi-Nu was 19 - 21t. Certainly not too large for the vessels in the fleet.

PzKpfw_1 #31 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 16:22

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View Postthandiflight, on Oct 26 2012 - 14:20, said:

As for Midway being the catalyst for the collapse, that is not true. Japan still had carriers and plenty of aircraft. The IJN was still very much a force to be reckoned with. It was only after the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" that the Navy effectively ran out of pilots. And after Leyte Gulf that the IJN was confined to home waters due to lack of oil. As for a lack of shipping capable of moving tanks that does not seem to be true either. The Chi-Nu was 19 - 21t. Certainly not too large for the vessels in the fleet.

I never stated Midway was the catalyst etc, it was the turning point. What i said was the material losses suffered had to be replaced which put a strain on the limited Japanese resources, yes they had carriers & planes etc, just very few experienced crews left to operate/fly them after Midway. The IJN did not sortie out till it had to, especialy after Midway, Leyte, etc. One of the cases where it was forced to was the Marianas. Just as well they didn't have fuel, with their track record on major surface engagements 1942 on.

What were they going to ship Chi-nu's  in? destroyers,? Light cruisers?,  US submarines had virtualy destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet, from 42 on they could not even supply their own garrisons, hell they were lucky to transport troops from Honshu to Kyushu, once US subs began operateing in the SOJ. Any Japanese tanks left would have been saved & deployed for home island defence; on Kyushu, vs Olympic they were already digging them in their when the war ended.

Regards, John Waters

Edited by PzKpfw_1, Oct 26 2012 - 16:36.


PzKpfw_1 #32 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 16:22

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And once again it dbl posted 8(...

Regards, John Waters

Edited by PzKpfw_1, Oct 26 2012 - 16:29.


Kankou #33 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 17:12

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View Postthandiflight, on Oct 26 2012 - 14:20, said:

The Chi-Nu was developed in 6 months in 1943 - at the height of the expansion and with resources at the maximum, but it was given a low priority for production. By the time it did enter production in 1944 resources were scarce. The truth is Japan NEVER gave much priority to armoured warfare. You simply do not asign a low priority to what the Army regards an essential item unless the Army does not regard it an essential item.
A country cannot produce more than what its industrial capacity allows it to produce. Only two companies and one military organization (Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sagami Arsenal) had the capabilities to produce tanks, and setting aside the problem of procuring steel (due to ships), there was the basic necessity of trucks and the like to manufacture in the first place. If you had a choice to build one tank for ten trucks within a limited capacity while you have a massive war front stretching from Burma to the Pacific Islands, from Indonesia to Manchuria, would tanks be of high or low priority?

thandiflight #34 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 21:39

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View PostPzKpfw_1, on Oct 26 2012 - 16:22, said:

I never stated Midway was the catalyst etc, it was the turning point. What i said was the material losses suffered had to be replaced which put a strain on the limited Japanese resources, yes they had carriers & planes etc, just very few experienced crews left to operate/fly them after Midway. The IJN did not sortie out till it had to, especialy after Midway, Leyte, etc. One of the cases where it was forced to was the Marianas. Just as well they didn't have fuel, with their track record on major surface engagements 1942 on.

What were they going to ship Chi-nu's  in? destroyers,? Light cruisers?,  US submarines had virtualy destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet, from 42 on they could not even supply their own garrisons, hell they were lucky to transport troops from Honshu to Kyushu, once US subs began operateing in the SOJ. Any Japanese tanks left would have been saved & deployed for home island defence; on Kyushu, vs Olympic they were already digging them in their when the war ended.

Regards, John Waters

I think you need to check your naval history for the Pacific as well as the time-line of events in the Pacific. Until Midway the USN was very much on the back foot. Midway did not win the War. It did not cripple the IJN. It merely reversed a series of losses that the USN had suffered and gave it time to recover and rebuild.

The Pacific submarine fleet was not sinking the massive tonnage of merchant shipping that it would later in the War. It was only very late in 1943 that the submarine fleets in the Pacific region began to impact significantly on the Japanese merchant shipping. In 1942 Japanese losses were only 89 000 tons, and by August 1943 they had only lost an additional 177 000 tons. After August the sinkings rose significantly. These figures pale into insignificance when compared to the losses that the U-boats inflicted in the Atlantic, or that were later sunk in the Pacific (over 2 million tons in 1944). At the end of 1942 the Japanese merchant fleet was about 6.5 million tons.

None of these issues existed in 1939. In 1943 it took only 6 months to develop the Chi-Nu. What happened between May 1939 and March 1943 (when Chi-Nu development began)? Resources were not that restricted then. The problems were known. And yet it took 4 years to respond. Yes, when it came round to producing the Chi-Nu the Japanese were facing declining resources - but not before then, at least not to the extent that would cripple production.

Edited by thandiflight, Oct 26 2012 - 21:40.


Kankou #35 Posted Oct 26 2012 - 23:48

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View Postthandiflight, on Oct 26 2012 - 21:39, said:

None of these issues existed in 1939. In 1943 it took only 6 months to develop the Chi-Nu. What happened between May 1939 and March 1943 (when Chi-Nu development began)? Resources were not that restricted then. The problems were known. And yet it took 4 years to respond.
Not sure if you missed my posts.....

View PostKankou, on Oct 26 2012 - 10:45, said:

And that is where your premise is wrong. The IJA did ask, but Japan was in no capability to support a running war in China (committing hundreds of thousands of troops) and also build the sufficient tank types/numbers to prepare for a rematch against the Soviets.

The production of the Shinhoto Chi-Ha, designed to counter Soviet tanks, was first produced starting from 1942, three years after Nomonhan. During the two year production time, 930 units were built. After that, the Type 1 Chi-He had 170 units and the Type 3 Chi-Nu amounted to 166 units. Supposing we include the original Type 97 Chi-Ha starting from 1938 (1,162 units), we have a total of 2,428 medium tanks of all kinds built between 1938 and 1945, which was the full capacity of the Japanese industry at the time. Compare this to the production of the Valentine, which amounted to 8,275 from 1939 to 1945. During the entire war, Japan was unable to produce less than 1/3 of a single British tank model, not because the Army didn't ask for it, but because there was no domestic capacity to produce the amount of tanks the IJA would have wanted in the first place.

View PostKankou, on Oct 26 2012 - 17:12, said:

A country cannot produce more than what its industrial capacity allows it to produce. Only two companies and one military organization (Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sagami Arsenal) had the capabilities to produce tanks, and setting aside the problem of procuring steel (due to ships), there was the basic necessity of trucks and the like to manufacture in the first place. If you had a choice to build one tank for ten trucks within a limited capacity while you have a massive war front stretching from Burma to the Pacific Islands, from Indonesia to Manchuria, would tanks be of high or low priority?


If I summarize: Japan did not have the kind of industrial capacity to make any large numbers of tanks, especially with the commitment to China requiring production of military trucks. This was basically a situation of trucks or tanks, never mind dealing with having to arm a massive occupation force and sending all the materials needed to the continent (meaning the Navy got a bigger piece of the pie). Unless Japan was willing to throw away naval defense and logistics, putting tanks as high priority was only possible if the leadership was criminally incompetent.


Also, you keep bringing up the six-month development time of the Chi-Nu, but that's quite irrelevant to the discussion. The Chi-Nu is essentially a slightly bigger version of the Chi-He, which had been designed in 1940. Furthermore, the Chi-Nu was the stop-gap for the larger and more powerful Chi-To, which was started in 1942. The Chi-Nu piggybacked on all the prior developments of other tanks, which essentially means the six-month development time is not the result of some special commitment, but basically nothing more than a premature result of all the research that came before. The Chi-Nu is basically the PzKpfw III to the Chi-Ha/Chi-He's PzKpfw III Ausf. A, with the Chi-To being the PzKpfw IV.

thandiflight #36 Posted Oct 27 2012 - 02:51

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View PostKankou, on Oct 26 2012 - 23:48, said:

Not sure if you missed my posts.....





If I summarize: Japan did not have the kind of industrial capacity to make any large numbers of tanks, especially with the commitment to China requiring production of military trucks. This was basically a situation of trucks or tanks, never mind dealing with having to arm a massive occupation force and sending all the materials needed to the continent (meaning the Navy got a bigger piece of the pie). Unless Japan was willing to throw away naval defense and logistics, putting tanks as high priority was only possible if the leadership was criminally incompetent.


Also, you keep bringing up the six-month development time of the Chi-Nu, but that's quite irrelevant to the discussion. The Chi-Nu is essentially a slightly bigger version of the Chi-He, which had been designed in 1940. Furthermore, the Chi-Nu was the stop-gap for the larger and more powerful Chi-To, which was started in 1942. The Chi-Nu piggybacked on all the prior developments of other tanks, which essentially means the six-month development time is not the result of some special commitment, but basically nothing more than a premature result of all the research that came before. The Chi-Nu is basically the PzKpfw III to the Chi-Ha/Chi-He's PzKpfw III Ausf. A, with the Chi-To being the PzKpfw IV.

1) At no point in the War did Japan implement any kind of Armoured Warfare Doctrine. This does not mean that they may not have had theoretical discussions about it, the simple fact is they did not use this form of tactical doctrine - ever.
2) The Army's doctrine of mobile warfare was mobile infantry, hence they prioritised trucks over tanks because they wanted to move large numbers of infantry. The tactical requirement for tanks was wedded to an infantry doctrine, not an armoured doctrine. In this situation the priority and demand for tanks would, of itself, be low. Hence tank development and deployment was not prioritized. This would prove costly.
3) The Navy had decided that its main opponents would be "Western Powers" - and hence the need for modern ships capable of taking on the opponent that they expected to face. But the Western Powers had tanks - even if at the early planning stage they were few in number and of relatively poor quality. So whilst the Navy planned to fight Western Powers, the Army seemed to have ignored this. There was, however, the recognition that the Western Powers would have the ability to rearm even if the initial quantity and quality of the tanks was poor, so decisive victories were required early, and that that territory would need to be held. Hence there was a glaring requirement for an armoured doctrine and clear evidence that the equipment that they had was inadequate and obsolete even before they engaged on any campaign.
4) Even if the West deployed its tanks in the infantry support role, it was still apparent, even by - and especially by - 1939, that the tanks that Japan possessed were woefully inadequate. Or did Japan think only the Soviets had tanks, and if they avoided confrontation with the Soviets then they would not require an armoured force? So instead of planning ahead, they had a rather belated and inadequate response.
5) By the time it finally dawned on the Army that they needed tanks they had already over-committed themselves and were now seriously under-resourced. That happens because of a lack of planning and the appropriate use of the resources available.
6) Your argument has been that they had restricted capacity and hence could not plan. My argument is they never foresaw the need nor planned appropriately, and that by the time it became patently obvious that there was a need, it was to late to adjust. The Army had planned to fight a peasant Chinese army and cover vast distances in doing so, the Navy planned to fight the West. The Army "got lucky" in its initial operations against the West nd so rested on its laurels until it was too late. You are trying to tell me it was "too late" for the Army at the start.

In a nutshell you are saying they could not plan because they did not have the resources. I am saying they never planned so never knew what resources they would need and hence how to best use those resources. The Navy, on the other hand, clearly did - and got first bite at the cherry

Kankou #37 Posted Oct 27 2012 - 03:23

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The thing is, why did they "never plan" (supposingly, given that you are ignoring the Ugaki consolidation plans and other attempts at reforms that sank due to lack of budgets and resources well before the start of the Sino-Japanese War)? You have not answered that question at any point in your posts and simply assume that the Japanese focus on infantry and spiritual were there from the start. Basically, you are ignoring the genesis of the Japanese army doctrines which stems from having to rely on infantry because of the inability to build up a modern motorized/armored military from both budgetary and material shortages. Everything stems back to the Meiji era, where Japan always had to deal with the lack of firepower, mobility, and logistics, because at almost no point in history were the Japanese able to keep up with the industrial requirements for the military actions they undertook.

As for your comment about the IJA ignoring the western powers: That stems from the dysfunctional system of the Japanese system itself, where the Army and Navy always went their separate ways, having two separate general war plans (Army against China/USSR, Navy against US/UK) and almost never coordinating with one another. In the view of the IJA there was never a need to consider how to counter the Anglo-American land forces, and that bit the Japanese back after the IJA agreed to Pearl Harbor.

thandiflight #38 Posted Oct 27 2012 - 05:02

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View PostKankou, on Oct 27 2012 - 03:23, said:

The thing is, why did they "never plan" (supposingly, given that you are ignoring the Ugaki consolidation plans and other attempts at reforms that sank due to lack of budgets and resources well before the start of the Sino-Japanese War)? You have not answered that question at any point in your posts and simply assume that the Japanese focus on infantry and spiritual were there from the start. Basically, you are ignoring the genesis of the Japanese army doctrines which stems from having to rely on infantry because of the inability to build up a modern motorized/armored military from both budgetary and material shortages. Everything stems back to the Meiji era, where Japan always had to deal with the lack of firepower, mobility, and logistics, because at almost no point in history were the Japanese able to keep up with the industrial requirements for the military actions they undertook.

As for your comment about the IJA ignoring the western powers: That stems from the dysfunctional system of the Japanese system itself, where the Army and Navy always went their separate ways, having two separate general war plans (Army against China/USSR, Navy against US/UK) and almost never coordinating with one another. In the view of the IJA there was never a need to consider how to counter the Anglo-American land forces, and that bit the Japanese back after the IJA agreed to Pearl Harbor.

I'm sorry, but that argument does not wash. There was a clear desire in the Navy to modernise - and they did. Clearly resources were available. Technical capability was available. Industrial capability was available. Or they could simply never have built the fleet. So the Army did not have tanks because they did not ask for them. They did not ask for them because it did not fit their doctrine. It did not fit their doctrine because they were wedded to a system of warfare that was obsolete. I have been saying this all along. The IJA's issues were institutional - irrespective of the cultural background because the Navy's personnel came from the same culture - not industrial. It was about ideology first and foremost.

Kankou #39 Posted Oct 27 2012 - 05:16

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At this point I'm not sure whether you're actually ignoring the issue of labor (shipbuilders cannot just easily build tanks), limitations of resources (the IJN sucked up most of the materials which could have been used for tanks), and the complex relationship between the rise of the IJN's political powers compared to the IJA (IJN worked with the parties, while the IJA had as much conflict within itself as it had with the IJN and the government), or just thinking of the situation as a game where you can just order up something and get it done. In fact, the sheer fallacy of your logic which contradicts the political-economical situation of Japan is problematic, to say the least.

Basically, you might as well try reading a bit on Japan before going on simplistic notions that are, to be polite, amatuerish and laughable to anyone who has done a bit of research on Japan during the 1930's. As a side note, consider this: If Japan had been able to build tanks if they willed it as you make it seem, why didn't that happen during the Ugaki era when four divisions had to be removed to make the budget for basic things as more machine guns, post-WW1 artillery, and airplanes?

thandiflight #40 Posted Oct 27 2012 - 05:44

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View PostKankou, on Oct 27 2012 - 05:16, said:

At this point I'm not sure whether you're actually ignoring the issue of labor (shipbuilders cannot just easily build tanks), limitations of resources (the IJN sucked up most of the materials which could have been used for tanks), and the complex relationship between the rise of the IJN's political powers compared to the IJA (IJN worked with the parties, while the IJA had as much conflict within itself as it had with the IJN and the government), or just thinking of the situation as a game where you can just order up something and get it done. In fact, the sheer fallacy of your logic which contradicts the political-economical situation of Japan is problematic, to say the least.

Basically, you might as well try reading a bit on Japan before going on simplistic notions that are, to be polite, amatuerish and laughable to anyone who has done a bit of research on Japan during the 1930's. As a side note, consider this: If Japan had been able to build tanks if they willed it as you make it seem, why didn't that happen during the Ugaki era when four divisions had to be removed to make the budget for basic things as more machine guns, post-WW1 artillery, and airplanes?

Fundamentally then, Japan's ambition exceeded its capability but it refused to recognise it? So the problem is not my logic, but Japan's leadership.





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