I'm just chiming in again to point out that this is the exact bias problem I already stated, as opposed to other loss report studies. You're just counting recovered wrecks, not all actual losses.
And note I am not saying it's propaganda. I am saying that the study is fundamentally flawed from a statistical perspective because the study selects only tanks collected by the Germans; hence implying retention of the battlefield.
Pretending this data can be used by historians as unquestionable fact is irresponsible to the extreme. It's the equivalent of saying "This drug is safe for babies" even though your sample size specifically excludes them.
So should we pretend they didn't exist? Even though we know that at the very end there were still some 300+ batteries dedicated against the Soviet ground forces?
(Moreover, counting only 88mm flak in the TO&E of the infantry units, when the 88mm flaks were usually Corp-level assets, is pretty poor and blatant creative accounting.)
And pretend that it was the mere 2,000 Tigers (of which only a fraction were always in service at any given time) are the causes of the 50% of Soviet losses?
That's a pretty laughable claim especially when you base it on this nonsense:
The Tiger War Diaries again. Which is full of kill claims, not actual kills (which is how the Tiger Battalion in Tunisia killed 150+ tanks despite not having fought at Kasserine)? With some outright imaginary engagements thrown in?
This is not credible proof of "tanks being the premiere killer of other tanks". It's a source that has been long in need of fact-checking on the Allied side, because the few studies that go in depth (i.e. Schneider's Tigers in Normandy) show that the claimed figures (i.e. 20+ tanks at Villers Bocage) are often multiplied by a factor of two or even three (the Brits lost only 7 tanks at Villers Bocage in reality, nine if you count two dummy Shermans)
Edited by Zinegata, Jan 14 2013 - 11:20.