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NATO Survey, 1943 Pt 2


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generalbunbun #61 Posted Jan 21 2015 - 21:50

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View PostThe_Chieftain, on Jan 14 2015 - 18:07, said:

 

I'm afraid I'm going to disagree with you on your statements.

 

Armored Force doctrine was not so ignorant as to think that they could break through and conduct an exploitation without considering the possibility that the enemy might happen to have a tank or two along. Note that FM 18-5, the TD manual, is purely defensive (at least as regards enemy armor), while the Armored Force Manual FM 17-10, states for example, on page 90 that the role of the medium tank (i.e. M3 and M4) includes dealing with hostile armor when on the offence. Further, the Armored Force FM only prohibits attacking equal or stronger enemy armored forces, which, in fairness, is pretty fundamental and would apply to any branch. Note also that the later FM 18-5 (1944) states that an armored division is capable of dealing with an enemy armored unit on its own, and the TD battalion might not be called up to action, though it is not recommended.

 

The reason the M4 had a "plane jane 75mm" was primarly because it took years to figure out how to correctly implement the 76mm in the tank, and the field commanders had no indication that they needed the ones which were available in the UK for D-Day. There was no doctrinal resistance in Armored Force to the concept of a bigger gun, and the US Army had changed to 76mm production in 1943. See http://worldoftanks....h-end_of_75_M4/ and http://forum.worldof...-armour-part-1/ and , http://worldoftanks....n-armor-part-2/

 

Chief,

 

I think it's interesting that the NATO report came out in 1943. The war changed in many ways in '43 as you know.  FM 18-5 was issued a year later.  My point is that the doctrine was changing, and that it was in its infancy in the beginning in '42.  The practicality of armored doctrine had not been tested or proven as the Armor had not been in battle.  The Armored Force certainly had not engaged enemy armor until Africa.  Even then, they fought a strong,veteran force under a strong veteran commander in Rommel.  So that made the gap even wider for the U.S. Army in the beginning.  Fortunately, the Armored Force adapted and was able to find success.

 

The implementation of the 76mm gun had something to do with the turret ring right?  


Edited by generalbunbun, Jan 21 2015 - 22:28.


generalbunbun #62 Posted Jan 21 2015 - 22:16

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View PostXlucine, on Jan 14 2015 - 23:17, said:

 

 

 

C'mon man, I'm an undergrad and even I understand that sources should support your points.

 

The very first part of FM 17-10 states

 

" ROLE.-The role of the Armored Force and its components
is the conduct of highly mobile ground warfare, primarily
offensive in character, by self-sustaining units of great
power and mobility, composed of specially equipped troops
of the required arms and services. Combat elements of the
Armored Force operate in close cooperation with combat aviation
and with large units of ground troops in the accomplishment
of a mission."

 

This means that the purpose of the Armored Force in 1942 what to attack the enemy using speed and mobility.  It does not mean that tanks were employed to engage tanks specifically.  There are parts in the manual about tank vs. tank engagement.  Look under "Special Operations" pp. 133(-ish PDF pages :( ).  Of course they knew that tanks would engage tanks at some point.  However, and sadly, they did not initially indoctrinate the Armored Force to do so, at least on a large scale level.  The part you cited was dealing on a smaller unit level structure, battalion,  I believe.  So if your tank company happens across an enemy light tank, of course its going to engage and not call the TDs to deal with it, which makes sense.  My point is that there was a lot more time spent on attacking static infantry positions than engaging in large formation tank battles.  This was a mistake in my opinion.  



Donward #63 Posted Jan 21 2015 - 22:20

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I dig how people think that just because tanks are primarily designed to fight tanks today that somehow they should have been solely designed to fight tanks in World War 2.

Xlucine #64 Posted Jan 22 2015 - 00:29

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View Postgeneralbunbun, on Jan 21 2015 - 21:16, said:

 

The very first part of FM 17-10 states

 

" ROLE.-The role of the Armored Force and its components
is the conduct of highly mobile ground warfare, primarily
offensive in character, by self-sustaining units of great
power and mobility, composed of specially equipped troops
of the required arms and services. Combat elements of the
Armored Force operate in close cooperation with combat aviation
and with large units of ground troops in the accomplishment
of a mission."

 

This means that the purpose of the Armored Force in 1942 what to attack the enemy using speed and mobility.  It does not mean that tanks were employed to engage tanks specifically. 

 

The word "tank" does not appear at all in that section you quoted. Literally all that section says is "tanks are powerful, they should drive around and fight things. Tanks should cooperate with things that are not tanks" - there is nothing about a restriction on battling enemy tanks, directly or indirectly. It is true that they do not state that tanks are only for attacking enemy tanks, which makes sense because the authors weren't stupid - tanks that do not attack things other than tanks are pretty useless. In addition, just because tanks are not exclusively to fight enemy tanks does not mean that fighting enemy tanks is one of the roles they are expected to fill.

 

Block Quote

There are parts in the manual about tank vs. tank engagement.  Look under "Special Operations" pp. 133(-ish PDF pages :( ).  Of course they knew that tanks would engage tanks at some point.  However, and sadly, they did not initially indoctrinate the Armored Force to do so, at least on a large scale level.  The part you cited was dealing on a smaller unit level structure, battalion,  I believe.  So if your tank company happens across an enemy light tank, of course its going to engage and not call the TDs to deal with it, which makes sense.  My point is that there was a lot more time spent on attacking static infantry positions than engaging in large formation tank battles.  This was a mistake in my opinion.  

 

On page 144 they explicitly state

Block Quote

TANK VERSUS TANK COMBAT.-a. General.-(1)  Large tank units and armored divisions are highly effective means to counter hostile mechanized forces.

 Yes, later in the paragraph they do say that tanks should be coordinated with tank destroyers and combat aviation when doing this, but that's just common sense - when you're fighting tanks, it's pretty stupid to not bring your tank destroyers to the party. If you think that the training did not focus on tank-on-tank action enough, then that is an entirely separate matter to FM 17-10 and there's no evidence to support such an assertion in that manual. It is quite clear from the actual combat results that the US army wasn't trained too badly for tank on tank action (as evidenced by the spectacular lack of successful german armoured thrusts against the americans), and the focus on static infantry targets you complain about is actually a pretty good representation of the vast majority of engagements in WW2



Walter_Sobchak #65 Posted Jan 22 2015 - 05:13

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View Postgeneralbunbun, on Jan 21 2015 - 16:16, said:

My point is that there was a lot more time spent on attacking static infantry positions than engaging in large formation tank battles.  This was a mistake in my opinion.  

 

I don't think the enemy often gives you a choice in what sort of battle you want to engage in. 

blurr91 #66 Posted Feb 11 2015 - 21:22

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My observation so far:

 

1. NATO = North African Theater of Operation, not North Atlantic Treaty Organization :teethhappy:

2. We need more arties

3. We need more recon

4. We need more observation


 

The various commanders had different requirements and different observations of the troops under their respective command.  But they all wanted more arties, arties with longer range, and way better situational awareness from more recon to better and more binocs and radio.


 

Another point.  One general liked aerial recon but agreed that it would be a resource at higher level.  Now we have drones for aerial recon at company level.  The marvel of technology!



Grand_Cookie #67 Posted Feb 25 2015 - 05:27

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View Postblurr91, on Feb 11 2015 - 14:22, said:

My observation so far:

 

1. NATO = North African Theater of Operation, not North Atlantic Treaty Organization :teethhappy:

2. We need more arties

3. We need more recon

4. We need more observation


 

The various commanders had different requirements and different observations of the troops under their respective command.  But they all wanted more arties, arties with longer range, and way better situational awareness from more recon to better and more binocs and radio.


 

Another point.  One general liked aerial recon but agreed that it would be a resource at higher level.  Now we have drones for aerial recon at company level.  The marvel of technology!

I bet a predator drone would make their heads explode. 






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