Jump to content


The Chieftain's Hatch: Undergunned in Italy


  • Please log in to reply
107 replies to this topic

zloykrolik #101 Posted Jan 22 2018 - 04:53

    Staff sergeant

  • Players
  • 35192 battles
  • 410
  • [RDTT2] RDTT2
  • Member since:
    05-05-2012

Chieftain, according to >Page 56.

Zero Armored Force officer s were battle casualties. How is that possible? Heck, even 10 Veterinary Officers were casualties. Perhaps they got folded in with Cavalry?

 

 



Zinegata #102 Posted Jan 22 2018 - 05:12

    Major

  • Beta Testers
  • 9922 battles
  • 5,425
  • Member since:
    07-27-2010

View Postzloykrolik, on Jan 22 2018 - 11:53, said:

Chieftain, according to >Page 56.

Zero Armored Force officer s were battle casualties. How is that possible? Heck, even 10 Veterinary Officers were casualties. Perhaps they got folded in with Cavalry?

 

 

 

Huh, good catch. I'm actually a bit inclined to think they may be folded into the cavalry numbers - but I would also note that 1st Cavalry ended up as an Infantry Division and that the majority of those losses may be from the surrender of the cavalry units in the Philippines. 


Edited by Zinegata, Jan 22 2018 - 05:14.


The_Chieftain #103 Posted Jan 22 2018 - 19:18

    Military Specialist

  • Administrator
  • 12143 battles
  • 9,847
  • [WGA] WGA
  • Member since:
    09-08-2011

There were no armored force officers. Tank officers were usually artillery or cavalry, with occasional engineers thrown in. So, yes, it stands to reason that total 'tank crew' casualties are actually a little over 1,500, given one out of every 25 tankers in a tank platoon was an officer. Branch and unit need not correlate: Plenty of non-cav officers in non-cav/armor positions in a cavalry division, for example.



Sister_Mary_Gearchange #104 Posted Mar 28 2018 - 08:29

    Sergeant

  • -Players-
  • 22991 battles
  • 105
  • Member since:
    03-07-2015

View PostHurk, on Jan 07 2018 - 19:01, said:

and this is where gameplay and reality divide. 

 

tank warfare was not a matter of seconds. it was a matter of days hours and minutes. its damn rare, even in modern combat, for tanks to get into pitched battles where any kind of tactical maneuvering matters. in WW2 it was even less so. 

 

[...]

 

[emp added]

the amount of time people aimed in, and took their time to shoot at an engine (waiting for enemy tanks to be in flanking position, etc) was common

 

 

Things have changed over time in terms of ranges and tactics, and it's certainly not the same terrain, but that was not my experience in Bosnia or Kuwait.

 

I agree with some of what you wrote, but my experience of 20+ years is that no on is aiming for engines (let alone "weak spots").  We aim simply to get on target and little else for the simple reason that if we *get the round on target at all* then our job is almost certainly done.  120mm HESH has a way of encouraging the other side to rethink their intentions.

 



LeatherHeads #105 Posted Mar 29 2018 - 22:53

    Corporal

  • Players
  • 94452 battles
  • 32
  • Member since:
    08-04-2011

this is all great information, now after the latest up-date, get the game back to where we can all play it?

then we can enjoy another round of facts.

 

 



FrozenKemp #106 Posted Mar 31 2018 - 23:42

    Major

  • Players
  • 50560 battles
  • 8,657
  • [HUSLN] HUSLN
  • Member since:
    04-24-2011

View PostSister_Mary_Gearchange, on Mar 28 2018 - 02:29, said:

Things have changed over time in terms of ranges and tactics, and it's certainly not the same terrain, but that was not my experience in Bosnia or Kuwait.

I agree with some of what you wrote, but my experience of 20+ years is that no on is aiming for engines (let alone "weak spots").  We aim simply to get on target and little else for the simple reason that if we *get the round on target at all* then our job is almost certainly done.  120mm HESH has a way of encouraging the other side to rethink their intentions.

 

 

I think people playing the game have an exaggerated idea of how good optics were in WW2.  No one had x16 zoom, or even, to the best of my meagre knowledge, x8.

Edited by FrozenKemp, Mar 31 2018 - 23:43.


robert_clark_destroyer #107 Posted Jul 15 2018 - 14:47

    Private

  • -Players-
  • 18230 battles
  • 9
  • [TXHM] TXHM
  • Member since:
    11-24-2016
bonus codes bonus codes...

Beausabre #108 Posted Dec 23 2018 - 17:40

    Corporal

  • -Players-
  • 10 battles
  • 37
  • Member since:
    06-18-2018

Let me point out something about mass production that is often not known - Friedman's Law (Norman Friedman is a distinguished historian of warship design - think of him as the Hunnicut of warships). It states "In mobilization you continue to build what you are already building" as disrupting the established production line costs too much in numbers.


 

Examples

1. The Eagle Boats of WWI - Henry Ford's attempt at mass production of ASW escorts during the Kaiser War. Only 60 of a planned initial installment of 120 were built - most finished postwar. The lesson was that once established, a production line is capable of prodigies, but Ford grossly underestimated how long it takes to set one up

2. Virtually all US aircraft in WWII were either in production or in final stages of design prior to US entry into WWII - many improved designs were disapproved for production reasons

3. The USAAF found that trying to install modifications shown to be desirable in light of combat experience was disrupting production. As soon as it got going, it had to shut down again to accommodate the latest changes. This led to the block system where a manufacturer would build a number of planes to a certain standard despite desired changes. Then the aircraft would be sent to medication center for any changes to be installed. The most famous of these was operated by United Air Lines at Cheyenne WY for B-17's

http://www.warbirdsandairshows.com/Aircraft%20manufacturing/modificationcenterswwii.htm

4. The British decision to keep building the 2 pounder after Dunkerque

5. The USN decision to cancel almost the entire 1940-41 generation of warship designs in favor of what was already in or about to go into production


 

Bottom line, for those saying why didn't the US Army just change from this to that, you can't turn production lines on and off like lightbulbs


 

 

 

 






1 user(s) are reading this topic

0 members, 0 guests, 0 anonymous users